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Abstract   
The idea of state responsibility for ensuring food security has gained ground, with 
strong popular mobilisations for the Right to Food around the world; but important 
variations prevail, both in the articulation of demands around food security 
interventions and in political responses to these. This paper takes a close look at 
India’s Public Distribution System, a programme with a long history and clear 
national-level, legislative backing, but considerable differences in prioritisation at the 
subnational level. Through an empirically rich and innovative comparison of 
Chhattisgarh with Jharkhand – both created at the same time, in 2000 – it asks why 
the opportunities afforded by statehood allowed Chhattisgarh to politically prioritise 
the PDS, but not Jharkhand. The paper finds that the explanation lies in the 
interrelated dimensions of political competition, the nature of pressures exerted by 
electorally significant societal groups, and political enablement of bureaucratic 
capacity. Finally, the analytical framework at the heart of the paper contributes to the 
emerging literature on the political conditions that allow the deployment of state 
capacity for the promotion of welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite long-term progress in reducing global hunger, millions across the world still 
experience food crises, undernourishment and even starvation deaths. Food, which 
claims about two-thirds of the poor’s expenditure, remains a matter of daily survival 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Responding to the persistence of hunger through food-
based social assistance programmes that ensure poor households meet basic 
nutritional standards, which in turn enables them to access and expand other human 
freedoms, then becomes the moral obligation of governments across the world. 
These programmes, particularly food subsidies, proliferated across more than 60 
countries in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia following the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, when food and fuel prices surged (Demeke et al., 2008). In addition 
to price inflation, the underlying moral economy of food subsidies and the idea of 
‘state responsibility’ have also been shaped by how popular movements framed their 
demands for food security interventions. Countries with strong popular mobilisations 
demanding a ‘Right to Food’, argued that food-based social assistance was not just a 
social and economic right, but an entitlement that is essential to ‘achieving economic 
democracy, without which political democracy is at best incomplete’ (Dreze, 2004: 
1728).  
 
Unfortunately, Amartya Sen’s famous mantra, that famines do not arise in 
democracies because the government in such regimes are compelled to act, has not 
translated into a similarly ubiquitous response and political commitment when it 
comes to ‘non-extreme forms of undernourishment’ (Dreze and Sen, 2013). There is 
wide variation, both in the articulation of demands and grievances around hunger and 
malnutrition, and in government responses, policy priorities, implementation and, 
ultimately, outcomes. While there is a large literature that has examined the impact of 
these subsidies, the politics behind the prioritisation of food policy reform and its 
delivery that may explain variation at the national and subnational levels has received 
far less attention. 
 
To address this gap, we focus on the case of India, which has had one of the longest 
histories of a food-based transfer programme. Responding to a legacy of droughts 
and local food shortages, India’s food security programme evolved from a public 
distribution system (PDS) targeted at urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s, to more 
generalised provision that extended to the rural population from the 1970s till the 
1990s, resulting in its considerable expansion. The widespread populistic appeal of 
the PDS in the context of the decline of the dominant Congress invited scathing 
criticisms of wastage of public resources in the new era of economic liberalisation 
post-1991 (Bhattacharya et al., 2017). The Targeted Public Distribution System took 
shape in 1997, aiming to give subsidised food to target BPL (below poverty line) 
households. Things changed dramatically in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when 
reports of chronic hunger (despite food surpluses held in stock) unleashed a 
remarkable spate of concerted civic activism across the country.  
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Timely judicial intervention and eventual political backing led to the passing of the 
historic National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013, which made India’s food security 
programme the largest in the world, providing highly subsidised foodgrain to roughly 
70 percent of the Indian population (Pande and Houtzager, 2016; Sinha et al., 2014; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2017). Many state governments played an incredible part in 
spearheading reforms, which were then incorporated into the national law 
(Bhattacharya et al 2017). Recognition of the political salience of food policy, of 
which the PDS is an integral part, was evident both nationally and at the subnational 
level. However, despite the NFSA providing an overarching national legislative 
architecture and system for procurement and distribution of food grains and 
monitoring of implementation, there remains considerable variation in reforms 
introduced at the subnational level and state capacities to deliver the programme.  
 
Table 1. Demographic and nutrition profiles of the two states 
  Jharkhand Chhattisgarh  
Population below poverty line (%) 37 40 
Indigenous population (%) 26 30 
  2006                
2016 
2006                
2016 
Infant mortality rate 
69                      
44 
   71                   
54 
Stunted children<5 (%) 
50                      
45                     
   53                   
38 
Wasted children<5 (%) 
32                      
29 
   20                  23 
BMI for women below normal (%) 
43                      
32 
   43                   
27 
      
Source: NFHS-IV, Census 2011. 
 
To examine this subnational variation in the political prioritisation and implementation 
of food policy, we focus on the unique paired comparison of Chhattisgarh and 
Jharkhand. These states were newly created in 2000, as a product of territorial 
reorganisation aimed at radical political devolution, which sought to bring the political 
centre closer to its adivasi populations, historically marginalised within huge 
subnational units with remote centres of power (Mawdsley, 2002; Tillin, 2013). The 
moment of statehood opened up new political opportunities in Chhattisgarh and 
Jharkhand, as political, bureaucratic and civil society actors toyed with different 
narratives and agendas for development, which, amongst other factors, shaped their 
subsequent welfare trajectories. In addition to the shared moment of statehood, 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand also have broadly similar demographic profiles, levels of 
poverty and performance across a range of HDI (Human Development Index) 
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indicators (see Table 1). This gave us a productive vantage point from which to study 
variation in the implementation of the PDS, where, instead of broadly similarly 
patterns of prioritisation and implementation, important differences emerge.  
 
While Chhattisgarh expanded the coverage of its food subsidy programme to 
become ‘quasi-universal’, even before the National Food Security Act was introduced 
in 2013, and undertook comprehensive reforms to make its PDS a nationally lauded 
model, mimicked later by other states (Sinha et al., 2014; Tillin et al., 2015), 
Jharkhand’s political leadership, on the other hand, has not demonstrated the same 
commitment to PDS reform, and implementation remains patchy, at best. According 
to a field survey (Public Evaluation of Entitlement Programmes 2013, cited in Dreze 
and Khera, 2014) conducted in the poorest districts of these two states before the 
National Food Security Act was rolled out, 81 percent of households were purchasing 
subsidised grain, compared to 50 percent in Jharkhand. Post-NFSA, coverage 
expanded substantially across both states; in Jharkhand it increased to 76 percent 
and in Chhattisgarh to 95 percent (Dreze et al., 2016; Dreze and Khera, 2014). 
According to the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report, Jharkhand’s 
preparedness for the roll-out of the NFSA was lower compared to Jharkhand. 
Chhattisgarh’s commitment to the PDS can also be gauged from its much more 
elaborate implementation architecture compared to Jharkhand’s relatively thin 
staffing (more details in Section 5.2). Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have both reduced 
‘leakages’ in the amount of grain released by the apex Food Corporation of India 
(that fail to reach the intended beneficiaries) dramatically since they became new 
states, (C< 51.7 percent to 9.3 percent, J < 85.2 percent to 44.4 percent from 2004-
05 to 2011-12; Dreze and Khera, 2015). However, the percentage of leakage still 
remains very high in Jharkhand, at 44 percent. Key differences in the PDS profiles of 
the two states are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Despite these differences, ‘better implementation’ of the PDS has not 
straightforwardly translated into superior nutrition outcomes in Chhattisgarh over 
Jharkhand, as Table 1 shows, confirming that improving nutrition depends on many 
factors (the three pillars of food security are availability, access and absorption: see 
FAO, 2008; besides, proximate drivers, including household behaviour and local 
context, as well as the overall political economy, also matter: see Walton, 2009). 
Nonetheless, states that have made long-running use of the PDS (like Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala) have also done well with reducing undernutrition (Raykar et al., 2015, 
Harriss and Kohli, 2009), and Chhattisgarh may well follow the same trajectory in the 
future. So far, both Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand face a daunting challenge of 
malnutrition and hunger, but only in the former did the political response to starvation 
deaths lead to the effective political prioritisation of the PDS for the betterment of 
food delivery.  
 
Existing scholarship provides limited insight on what might be driving these 
differences. Studies that provide accounts of subnational variations in PDS reform  
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
5	
	
Table 2. PDS profiles of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh 
  Chhattisgarh Jharkhand 
Programme indicators* 
Proportion of poor households covered by 
the PDS pre-NFSA (2011) (%) 49.9 25.3 
Proportion of poor households covered by 
the PDS post-NFSA (%) 90.3 82.6 
 
Estimated leakage (2011) (%) 9.3 44.4 
 
Monthly subsidy transfer Rs 286 Rs 144 
 
Reform initiatives 
 
Consistent reforms 
since 2001. 
Reforms first 
introduced in 
2009. 
PDS and ruling party 
 
Key element of BJP 
and Congress 
campaigns. 
 
Not a priority 
campaign 
agenda. 
Staff deployment  
 
Deeper 
organisational 
structure. Large 
number of dedicated 
field staff for PDS, 
such as food 
inspectors. 
Shallow 
organisational 
structure. 
Smaller cadre 
of field 
functionaries. 
No dedicated 
food inspector 
position.  
Subsidised food items other than 
foodgrains 
Pulses, salt Salt 
NFSA implementation according to CAG 
report (2015)* Complete  Partial 
Date of implementation of NFSA Jan 2014 Oct 2015 
Sources: Bhattacharya et al. (2017), Puri (2017), RBI State Budgets 
Analysis. 
 
*Criteria included identification of eligible beneficiaries and issuing of ration cards; 
existence of required infrastructure, initiation of TPDS reform and a functioning 
grievance redress system.  
 
and implementation have only gone as far as to say that it is political ‘will’, ‘interest’ or 
‘commitment’ that matters, indicating that this is largely at the level of political elites 
(Khera, 2011; Rahman, 2014).  While this is an important condition, elite politics 
alone does not explain how the backing of a redistributive welfare agenda emergedin 
the first place, and how it translates into implementation. In response, the paper aims 
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to provide a systematic political analysis of how statehood acted to create the 
political conditions in which the PDS was prioritised in one state, but not another. The 
paper draws on a research project spanning two-and-a-half years (2014-2016), with 
four phases of iterative fieldwork in the two state capitals (Raipur and Ranchi, 
and four district headquarters: Korba and Raigarh; West Singhbhum and 
Hazaribagh). In total, 110 semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of 
actors, including politicians, government officials at different levels, activists, 
journalists, dealers, rice millers and others.   
 
The paper is organised as follows: a theoretical literature review around states and 
the pursuit of welfare and the analytical approach being used (Section 2); the politics 
of the PDS and the ground for comparative subnational research (Section 3); the 
political moment of statehood of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand (Section 4); the 
substantive empirical analysis of why the PDS was politically prioritised in 
Chhattisgarh but not in Jharkhand (Section 5); and, finally, the conclusion (Section 
6). 
2. The political prioritisation of welfare: Theoretical review and analytical 
approach 
There is an extensive literature on the nature, scope and conditions that define and 
differentiate between particular welfare states. While the main preoccupation of this 
literature has been to produce typologies of welfare states, the focus of this paper 
addresses the broader questions of ‘Why do some states pursue extensive welfare 
reform, while others do not?’ Or, more specifically, ‘What explains the prioritisation of 
different kinds of social policies?’ This section begins with a brief review of the two 
classic approaches to studying welfare regimes, the class-based relational approach 
and the democratic politics approach. It situates the vast majority of existing work on 
subnational welfare regimes in India within these. It goes on to discuss a more recent 
strand of scholarship around state capacity and political settlements, which, the 
paper argues, provides the most proximate and therefore useful analytical framework 
for the comparative analysis being carried out here. The question of what political 
conditions matter for the deployment of state capacity is as pertinent to this literature 
as it is to this paper. The section concludes with the analytical framework that will 
guide our enquiry. 
 
The class-based relational approach is marked by the iconic contributions of Esping-
Anderson (1990) and Huber and Stephens (2001) and involves the study of welfare 
as distribution and the institutionalisation of class preferences. In this highly 
influential tradition of analysis (see, for example: Kohli, 1987; Corbridge and Harriss, 
2000; Herring, 1988; Heller, 2000, to name a few) the strength of left-oriented 
political parties, often linked to social movements, becomes a critical determinant of 
the welfare orientation of the state. Many authors have drawn out the relationships 
between broad-based social coalitions and the formulation of inclusive social welfare 
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policies across the global South (Dreze and Sen, 2013; Garay, 2016; Evans, Huber 
and Stephens, 2017).  
 
The democratic politics approach focuses on the role of elections, electoral pressures 
and the form, as well as degree, of party political competition in influencing welfare 
policies. Democratic competition in general tends to be associated with an expansion 
of public goods provisioning, useful to incumbents (Garay, 2016; Whitfield and 
Therkildsen, 2011). This literature has also emphasised the mechanisms of negative 
electoral pressures on public investment, like vote buying (Khemani 2010), and 
targeted approaches, as opposed to inclusive, universalistic welfare measures 
(Keefer and Khemani, 2005; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2015). 
 
Within India, some of the most influential explanations around subnational variation in 
the pursuit of welfare agendas have centred around the class bases of political 
regimes (Kohli, 1987, 2001), the role of subnational identity (Singh, 2016), and the 
nature of electoral competition (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004). Kohli’s approach has 
been particularly enduring in importance with its identification of well organised left-
of-centre regimes, which were sufficiently autonomous of the propertied classes to be 
able to steer state intervention in the interests of subordinate classes. More broadly, 
research into civil society, social movements and decentralised public action has 
provided insights into how Indian states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have 
successfully pursued welfare agendas (Heller, 2000; Srinivasan, 2014). Somewhat 
complementary to these accounts, albeit distinctive in focus, is Singh’s (2016) 
argument that the invocation of ‘imagined’ subnational politico-cultural communities 
influences social development. Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004), on the other hand, 
show how when competing within a two-party environment, public goods provisioning 
would be likelier than in a multiparty context. In the former situation, each party is 
equally motivated by the need to build cross-cleavage coalitions to win elections, 
whereas in the latter, with a fewer proportion of seats required for winning, all parties 
appeal to disparate ‘vote banks’ via the distribution of club, not public, goods. 
 
While insightful, this range of explanations does not shed adequate light upon the 
particular political conditions that directly shape the ‘deployment of state capacity’ for 
the pursuit of welfare (Vom Hau and Hickey, 2016: 1). Most writings on state capacity 
agree that the organisational quality of the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and 
external embeddedness of the state in social networks, on the other, are cardinal 
elements (Vom Hau, 2012), but capacity itself must be treated separately from the 
purposes for which it is used (Centeno et al., 2017). These authors also emphasise 
that while leadership is not included as a part of the definition of state capacity, 
political leadership – as a direct outcome of the broader political context – is highly 
pertinent to its exercise.  
 
A large scholarship has developed in order to explore the role of political coalitions 
amongst different social groups and classes for the study of state capacity (Vom 
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Hau, 2012; Vom Hau and Hickey, 2016). This approach has been dubbed the 
‘political settlements’ approach, where the political settlement is the basis of any 
state and is arrived at through a historical process of struggle and bargaining 
between elite groups (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Khan, 2010; Mehta and Walton, 
2014; Parks and Cole, 2010; Kelsall and Heng, 2016. This literature understands the 
organisation and capacities inscribed within the formal structures of the state in terms 
of the distribution of power, and also foregrounds the role of elite politics in analysing 
how state capacity is deployed.1 Subsequently, two broad types of settlement have 
been distinguished for the analysis of the developmental capacities of states: the first 
is a ‘dominant party settlement’ that involves a stable ruling coalition in power, which 
facilitates a strong elite vision for development; and the  second is a ‘competitive 
settlement’, with regular shuffles to the ruling coalition which promotes a short-term 
outlook amongst elites, and is inimical to a developmental vision and outcomes 
(Levy, 2014; Hickey et al., 2016). 
 
Other complementary approaches to understanding the developmental capacities of 
states have focused on the crucial interrelationship between the forms of democratic 
politics, the extent of ‘autonomy’ wielded by governmental elites (elected and non-
elected), their relationship with civil society, and the larger politics of social 
assistance in developing countries (see Barrientos and Pellisery, 2015; Besley and 
Ghatak, 2007; Mookherjee, 2004). There is a rich literature on the micro politics of 
social assistance as well (Zucco, 2008; Pellissery, 2008; De La O, 2013; Pattenden, 
2017). Tillin et al (2015) in particular seek to understand the ‘mechanisms and 
dynamisms’ within political and administrative processes, distinguishing between 
different ‘welfare regimes’ on this basis (more on this in Section 3). 
2.1 Analytical approach 
This last body of literature successfully combines the strength of the classic 
approaches to the study of welfare as previously discussed, while offering conceptual 
tools for more proximate subnational analysis into the question: why do some states 
politically prioritise welfare, whereas others do not? Drawing upon this scholarship, 
the analysis pursued in this paper will focus on three interrelated analytical 
dimensions: 
 
(i) Nature of political and electoral competition: India is a competitive 
democratic polity and periodic shuffles to the ruling coalition are the norm. 
But there can be considerable variation in the nature of party political 
competition, depending on whether there is contained two-party 
competition, or highly fragmented and dynamic multi-party competition 
(refer to Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004 on this point). Here ‘dominant’ 
ruling coalitions generally do not hold monopoly power (Levy, 2014; 
Hickey et al., 2016), and ‘competitive’ political settlements vary in their 
																																																								
1 Refer to Di John and Putzel (2009: 15) for a useful characterisation of ‘elites’ in the context 
of the political settlements literature. 
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extent of elite consolidation or fragmentation (see also Mehta and Walton, 
2014. Are the principal political elites engaged in fairly contained party 
political competition, or is there a dispersal/fragmentation of the party 
landscape? Although both these scenarios are possible within competitive 
political settlements, where elite competition is more contained, there is 
greater stability of high-level rent seekers. In contrast, where such 
competition is relatively more dispersed, there is a greater churn and 
therefore instability in high-level rent seekers. This, we argue, has serious 
implications for the capacity of ruling elites to pursue developmental 
outcomes within competitive, democratic political settings like in India.2 
 
(ii) Relationships between political parties and social bases: Regional- and 
national-level political parties in India have increasingly mobilised highly 
dynamic constituencies cross-cutting between class, caste and tribe. 
Understanding the cross-cutting social bases of political parties is 
essential, in order to evaluate the incentives governing ruling elites to 
appease their constituencies. We consider the conditions in which ruling 
political and bureaucratic elites are particularly responsive to specific 
societal pressures, not only from electorally powerful social groups, but 
also from civil society organisations that are campaigning for expanded 
social protection. 
 
 
(iii) Political enablement of bureaucratic capacity: Following Centeno, Kohli 
and Yashar (2017) and Tillin et al. (2015), the political leadership’s ability 
and inclination to motivate and create spaces for key bureaucrats to 
pursue policy reform for developmental gains is emphasised (see also 
Melo, Nge’the and Manor, 2012). In this approach, bureaucratic capacity 
(or state capacity more broadly) is a relational concept that depends on 
the electoral and social configuration of political competition and the 
political leadership within this context (see Vom Hau, 2012; Vom Hau and 
Hickey, 2016).  Importantly, for our analysis, the distinction we draw is not 
between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions (as do Levy and Walton, 2013; 
Kelsall and Heng, 2016), but between the specific deployment of 
bureaucratic capacity for developmental objectives by the political 
leadership in one, versus its conspicuous absence in the other. 
(Personalised relationships between politicians and key bureaucrats are 
																																																								
2  There is a large scholarship on rents to better grapple with the relationship between 
economics and politics (Levy, 2014). Khan and Jomo (2000) and North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2013) have both distinguished between the outcomes of rent seeking in institutional settings 
that are impersonal, and those where the rules of the game are competitive. This approach 
does not entirely hold in the Indian context (please see the subsequent paragraph). As we 
discuss, the distinction is also not as clear as between centralised or decentralised rent 
seeking, for there are a large number of rent seekers in both, with multiple transactions of 
various kinds. What matters is the stability of the highest level of rent seekers (i.e., the top 
political leadership). 
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commonly observed throughout India, yielding a range of developmental 
orientations, not just clientelistic ones.)3 
 
 
3. Politics of the Public Distribution System: Framing comparative 
subnational research 
While there is a strong moral imperative that drives demands for food-based social 
assistance, the case of a concrete food security programme like the PDS affirms that 
there are powerful political incentives that come into play as well. This section briefly 
explains the politics of the PDS, showing how subnational research has already 
provided critical insight into the many ways that food becomes politicised, sometimes 
with significant implications for reform. It concludes with a clear delineation of the 
research questions that frame the comparative analysis between Chhattisgarh and 
Jharkhand at the heart of this paper, outlining the distinctive contribution it seeks to 
make. 
 
Mooij’s (1998, 1999) authoritative accounts confirm a number of historical shifts in 
the political economy of India’s PDS. What started as an urban food-rationing 
programme to stabilise prices in the post-war years, later acquired a strong rationale 
for distributing food to the poorer sections of society, but also, importantly, to 
guarantee reasonable prices to farmers and increase production. As the PDS 
expanded from the 1960s onwards, it became germane to the country’s overall 
strategy for food self-sufficiency. Over the years, the central government (via the 
Food Corporation of India and the Agricultural Prices Commission) has tried to 
encourage production by purchasing foodgrain from farmers at a predetermined 
minimum support price (MSP).  
 
Ever since the Green Revolution in the late 1960s, a new class of largely OBC (Other 
Backward Classes) politically assertive farmers acquired electoral importance, both 
at the centre and in the states. Intensified regional politics and the rising power of 
agricultural lobbies led to many populist leaders in the states (NTR in Andhra 
Pradesh and Hegde in Karnataka are examples) using food subsidy policies to 
appeal to voters and farming groups. The central government introduced 
decentralised procurement in 1997-98 that led states to procure, store and distribute 
foodgrains on its behalf. While this was ostensibly done to reduce expenditure on 
storage and transportation on allocation, in practice, states were able to distort farm 
policy in order to earn the political support of farmers by setting high procurement 
prices to acquire foodgrain, regardless of need; ‘the procurement price is more 
politics than economics’ (Dharm Narain, Chairman of APC, cited in Raghavan, 2004). 
																																																								
3 This has strong resonance with the debate on the relative embedded autonomy of political 
and economic elites (Evans, 1994, 1995), which has powerfully illustrated that personalised 
relationships are pervasive within states, and what ultimately matters is the use to which 
these are put. ‘The balance between predatory and developmental activities is not clear cut, 
but varies over time and depends on what kinds of activities are attempted’ (Evans 1994). 
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Large-scale procurement strategies by the state have been routinely criticised for 
distorting the market and strangulating private trade (Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices, 2013). A high-level committee set by the central government in 
2014 recommended that the entire burden of procurement be borne by a handful of 
select states (including Chhattisgarh) that are equipped infrastructurally to do so 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2017). This will ensure the continued electoral appeal of the 
PDS in these states.  
 
Figure 1: The Public Distribution System in India 
 
Source: Bhattacharya et al. (2017). 
 
Moreover, the procurement chain involves a large number of powerful stakeholders 
both within (food quality inspectors) and outside (rice millers and transporters) the 
government, indicating that the potential for collusion amongst vested interests to 
siphon away grain to the open market is high. The distribution chain is equally 
fraught, with quality inspectors, godown managers, transporters and dealers all 
expected to act honestly in order for food to reach the intended beneficiaries (see 
Figure 1 for an elaborate diagram of the different links of the PDS). The programme 
has been historically associated with extremely high levels of corruption, ranking third 
amongst the five basic services (schooling, water supply, PDS, electricity and 
hospitals), according to the India Corruption Study 2005 (Transparency International 
India, 2005)4.  
																																																								
4 See also, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan047870.pdf 
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Nonetheless, these political incentives for patronage, subsidies and rent-seeking 
have interacted differently with state-level politics, with vastly different implications for 
PDS reform. In Karnataka, it was the election of a minority Janata government 
defeating the long-standing Congress in 1983 that proved to be the catalyst, with 
Ramakrishna Hegde attempting to follow on the populist legacy of the 1970s leader, 
Devraj Urs. The Green Card Scheme he introduced vastly expanded the provision of 
cheap food to the poorest (Mooij, 1998, 1999). In Kerala, on the other hand, it was 
the strained relationship between the centre and the state government, following the 
particularly acute food shortage in Kerala in 1964, that led to vigorous social 
mobilisation by the cadres of the ruling CPI(M) (Mooij, 1999). All the political 
contenders (Congress as well as the leftist parties) promised to check price rises and 
expand the PDS in their election promises. Reporting on events until it was bifurcated 
in 2000, Mooij (2001) argues that Bihar’s politics, however, militated away from any 
constructive political emphasis on PDS reform. Corrupt dealers of fair price shops 
colluded with an equally corrupt food bureaucracy, which also depended upon 
political patrons. While there was political attention to the PDS aplenty, it was not for 
reform, but for rent-seeking.   
 
This wave of early scholarship shed light upon the political dynamics underpinning 
various populist moves around the PDS; however, it stopped short of offering any 
systematic basis of comparisons across states. For the large part, subnational 
research on the PDS has concentrated on the important matter of implementation 
outcomes, with contrasts around improvement in delivery, for example, but little in-
depth understanding of the question of political prioritisation of this welfare 
programme (see Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Dreze and Khera, 2015; Chatterjee, 
2014; Puri, 2012; amongst others). In a more recent contribution though, Tillin et al. 
(2015) further comparative political analysis on why states pursue welfare agendas 
differently.  
 
They distinguish between two groups of subnational welfare regime in India, based 
on the nature of support for the political leadership, the autonomy and capacity of the 
bureaucracy, and the strength of civil society and its relationship with the state. The 
first group comprises the more consistent ‘welfare performers’, either due to broad-
based political support (‘social democratic’ parties in power, like in Kerala and West 
Bengal, or ‘competitive populism’, like in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh); or when 
a dominant socio-economic elite with a narrow social base nevertheless implements 
social protection policies (‘incorporationist’ regimes like Chhattisgarh or Odisha). The 
second cluster comprises the less consistent performers with a lower level of 
commitment to pursuing welfare policies, because of either the nature of political 
competition or the orientation of the leadership not being conducive (pro-business 
states like Gujarat, ‘competitive clientelist’ states like UP and Bihar, and ‘predatory’ 
states like Jharkhand are all included). 
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Although not restricted to the PDS, Tillin et al. (2015)’s framework offers some clues 
for the two cases at hand here. Chhattisgarh is classified as a consistent welfare 
performer with demonstrated commitment to a fairly expansive social policy 
programme. This is despite the fact that its political leadership is dominated by a 
narrow socio-economic elite and weakly organised lower classes and castes. 
Jharkhand, on the other hand, is classified as a more ‘extreme case’ of a predatory 
state, where the political regime has not shown any consistent commitment to a 
broad-based social policy agenda, where power is personalised, political parties are 
fragmented and the authority of the bureaucracy is limited to some discretionary 
power at best (Tillin et al., 2015). The authors attribute Chhattisgarh’s PDS reform to 
the ‘administrative dividends’ by virtue of being a new state, but do not explain why 
these same dividends were not cashed in by Jharkhand, despite the presence of 
significant other ‘enabling’ features. 
 
The distinctive contribution this paper seeks to make lies in addressing the question: 
why did Chhattisgarh politically prioritise the PDS, whereas Jharkhand did not, 
despite their common moment of creation in 2000?  There are three other points that 
further complicate the puzzle. 
 
(i) Given that Jharkhand’s demand for statehood emerged from a strong 
mobilisation of its tribal population, whereas Chhattisgarh lacks a 
comparable movement, why has Jharkhand’s political elite not been able 
to drive the social policy agenda and serve the interests of its core 
constituency in the way that Chhattisgarh’s upper caste leadership has? 
While the alignment of political leadership and bureaucratic incentives in 
pursuing PDS reform in Chhattisgarh can be one explanation (Tillin et al., 
2015), what is the social and electoral basis driving this leadership’s 
orientation, and how is it different from that in Jharkhand? 
 
(ii) Tillin et al. (2015) argue that rents generated from extractive activity in 
Chhattisgarh are used to reward a narrow set of elites, and 
simultaneously insulate welfare programmes like the PDS from 
interference, which would otherwise have seen much higher levels of 
leakages. Moreover, in a context where extraction and industrialisation 
have triggered intense and violent conflicts, the effective functioning of the 
PDS and other welfare measures has become an increasingly important 
electoral strategy. But, in fact, both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are 
mineral-rich states with extractive rent-seeking and intense local conflicts, 
and yet, only Chhattisgarh insulated its PDS for reform, while Jharkhand 
did not. Why? 
 
(iii) Third, given its rich social movement history, Jharkhand perhaps has a 
denser, more active network of civil society groups and activists compared 
to Chhattisgarh that has regularly petitioned the state on a range of social 
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policy and human rights concerns. Also, Chhattisgarh has a record of 
oppressing civil society action. However, in Chhattisgarh, state-level 
bureaucrats worked ‘intimately’ with civil society activists who raised 
issues of health and nutrition, which played an important role in facilitating 
PDS reforms. Why did such a ‘close and productive relationship’ (Tillin et 
al., 2015) between key bureaucrats and civil society develop in 
Chhattisgarh, which facilitated citizen involvement in the design and 
implementation of food policy, but not in Jharkhand?  
 
 4. The political moment of statehood and politics since 
This section offers a brief account of how the two states came into existence. It 
draws attention to the distinctive socio-political configurations that informed their 
respective political settlements at statehood, and their political trajectories since. 
At the outset, the role of the Centre warrants recognition in regard to the formation of 
these new states. The political dynamics between the ruling parties at the centre and 
state (BJP-led NDA and the Laloo Yadav-led RJD in Bihar), led to strong backing for 
Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh’s statehood followed in the same political momentum 
(see Tillin, 2013). All this unfolded within a larger context of economic liberalisation 
and deregulation, and the creation of ‘competition states’ that would clamour for 
private capital (Jenkins, 2011; Corbridge, 2011). Despite the significant part played 
by the centre in driving state bifurcation, highly specific political configurations 
emerged at the subnational level. This was in keeping with the diverse character of 
the Indian polity. Indeed, the conditions leading to the formation of the two new states 
were very different (Berthet, 2011; Tillin, 2013). In Jharkhand, the movement for 
statehood was at least partly associated with half a century of popular social 
movements of adivasis, low caste peasants and mine workers. In Chhattisgarh, there 
was no such popular coalition (see Lefebvre, 2011). The demand for statehood 
developed amongst OBC elites, as a strategy to challenge the hold of high caste 
elites that dominated the Madhya Pradesh Congress.  
 
The hallmark feature of Jharkhand’s politics is its adivasi political legacy. It is the site 
of India’s first modern adivasi political party, the Jharkhand Party, which led an 
unsuccessful bid for statehood back in the 1950s (Kumar, 2011). The proliferation of 
numerous Jharkhandi adivasi parties since, each claiming to be the true inheritors of 
the Jharkhand Party, meant that Jharkhand’s political landscape became irreversibly 
fragmented (ibid.). The parties had nothing much to distinguish them from one 
another. Even the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), which spearheaded radical 
politics about land alienation and feudal exploitation in the 1970s, became mired in 
corruption scandals close to the time of statehood (Singh, 2008; Tillin, 2013). Since 
2000, no political coalition was able to form a government for the full five-year term, 
with the BJP-led phase since 2014 being an exception. Jharkhand’s adivasi parties 
have competed with a marginal Congress and a rising BJP. The current Chief 
Minister (CM), BJP’s Raghubar Das, is the first non-adivasi CM of the state. The 
social bases of adivasi parties have been changing. Fewer adivasis and more OBCs 
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and upper castes voted for the JMM between 2000 and 2014, even as more adivasis 
voted for the BJP.5 
 
Chhattisgarh has a strong upper caste ‘outsider’ (Rajputs and Marwaris mainly) 
element, which has arrived over the decades, taking advantage of its unexploited 
land and timber resources. These, together with the sizeable OBC population (nearly 
39-40 percent at the time of statehood), have combined to marginalise adivasis (also 
a numerous 31.8 percent) and Scheduled Castes (12 percent roughly) in terms of 
political representation (see Berthet, 2011). There are no dedicated adivasi political 
parties (the CPI had a strong following in the Bastar region before the Naxals 
imposed an electoral boycott; Mukherji, 2012, Sundar, 2016). OBC elites have striven 
to gain prominence within both the Congress and BJP, and have been 
accommodated variously too, though they continue to be unhappy with the 
concentration of power amongst the higher castes in the ruling BJP.6 The two parties 
are locked in close electoral contest, with the Congress maintaining a healthy seat 
share through the BJP’s consecutive terms in office (2003, 2008 and 2013). This 
creates a continuous pressure on the ruling party to dole out populist measures.  
5. Explaining why the PDS was prioritised in Chhattisgarh, not 
Jharkhand 
In this substantive analytical section, we first briefly summarise the timeline of PDS 
reforms in the two states, and then address the key question at the heart of this 
paper. 
5.1. Reforms timeline 
While Chhattisgarh introduced a series of PDS reforms relating to both procurement 
of grain as well as its delivery to the poor right from its formation, Jharkhand 
introduced few new initiatives until 2009. Moreover, the reforms timeline presented in 
Figure 2 shows that Chhattisgarh took a systemic view of the PDS, employing both 
demand- and supply-side measures that have yielded gains in coverage and reduced 
leakages in delivery (Bhattacharya et al., 2017). 
 
Chhattisgarh made effective use of technology, even winning the Prime Minister’s IT 
award in 2007.7 Chhattisgarh is the second state to have achieved near universal 
PDS coverage in 2007 (Tamil Nadu before in 1992; HP, Kerala, AP, Assam and 
Rajasthan have expanded considerably). In Jharkhand, it was during a period of 
President’s rule in 2009 (imposed on account of political instability), where a 
proactive governor (K. Sankaranarayanan) worked directly with a senior bureaucrat, 
 
																																																								
5 We are very grateful to Lokniti, CSDS, for sharing their election survey data for the years 
2000-14 for the two states. 
6  https://www.firstpost.com/politics/chhattisgarh-why-raman-singh-should-take-the-obc-stir-
seriously-653489.html  
7 Interview with secretary food and civil supplies, Raipur, June 2015.  
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Figure 2: PDS reforms trajectory in the two states 
 
 
the food and civil supplies secretary, without the distractions of political pressures, 
that the first reforms were launched. In the later years, more reforms were introduced 
here too, but by this time, PDS reform had acquired national currency of sorts, and 
states were engaged in mimetic learning. The central government has acted as a 
facilitator. For instance, it championed decentralised procurement in 1998 after the 
advances in states like Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu, and developed a nine-point 
action plan in 2006-07 aiming at reducing PDS leakages, which was formalised in 
2012 after consultations with state food ministers.  
5.2 Discussion and analysis 
In this section, the paper turns to a substantive discussion of how the three main 
analytical dimensions interact to explain why the PDS was politically prioritised in 
Chhattisgarh, not Jharkhand. The analytical map (see Figure 3 below) depicts these 
nested relationships and effects.  
 
In the first part of the analysis, we see how the nature of political and electoral 
competition and the social bases of political parties come together to inform the 
making of the PDS as political common sense in Chhattisgarh, not Jharkhand. The 
significance of key intermediate processes like the mobilisation of farmers and the 
curtailment of private dealers is highlighted. We also see how elite consolidation 
versus fragmentation, as a sub-dimension of the nature of political and electoral 
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competition, shapes the ability of the political leadership to pursue developmental 
goals, and subsequently, the isolation of the PDS for reform. 
 
This leads on to the second part, where we consider the developmental orientation of 
the political leadership, a sub-dimension of the political enablement of bureaucratic 
capacity. We show how this is critical to Chhattisgarh investing in improving the 
functional capacity of the state, as well as responding to positive societal pressures 
for PDS reform, while this is markedly absent in Jharkhand. This part also shows how 
key outcomes result, like responsiveness during critical junctures like hunger deaths, 
and, importantly, PDS policy innovation. 
 
And finally, in the third part, we probe into the further implications of the coexistence 
of high-level rent-seeking with PDS functionality. The stability of rent seekers (a sub-
dimension of the nature of political competition) in Chhattisgarh aided the isolation of 
the PDS for reform, but did not preclude programme-specific corruption to continue. 
On the other hand, the continuous improvements in bureaucratic capacity in 
Chhattisgarh resulted in PDS functionality despite PDS corruption, a scenario 
conversely absent in Jharkhand. 
 
Figure 3: Analytical map 
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5.2.1 Political and social configuration of electoral competition: the making of 
PDS as political common sense 
The two newly formed states have been marked by strikingly different terms of 
political competition. Chhattisgarh has seen the BJP and the Congress in close 
contest. The BJP has ruled the state for three consecutive terms since 2003, under a 
dominant chief minister, Raman Singh. In contrast, Jharkhand has seen very short-
lived coalition governments for the most part since 2000 (12 changes including three 
spells of president’s rule in 14 years). It has been under continuous majority rule 
(under the BJP) only since 2014. Both states have ‘competitive’ political settlements, 
in the specific sense of two- or multi-party competition, though only one has had the 
benefit of a dominant political leader in power. While, in principle, Chhattisgarh, by 
virtue of its longer staying political leader, is more likely to prioritise development 
reform than Jharkhand, the case of the PDS affirms the operation of a more 
complicated socio-political process. 
 
It is incontestable that Raman Singh has displayed astute political acumen in 
responding proactively to electoral and other signs, thereby prioritising the PDS and 
isolating it for reform (we discuss this next). However, this is also because the 
farming lobby, especially from the fertile rice-producing central plains region, is 
critical to Chhattisgarh’s electoral politics. In fact, both political parties have focused 
on PDS-related procurement measures, primarily in the run-up to elections. A top 
Congress opposition leader said, ‘Chhattisgarh is a single crop state, so if farmers do 
not get bonuses (above the Minimum Support Price), then what will happen?’ 8 
Farming lobbies like the Kisan Mazdoor Mahasangh are vocal politically. 9 
Chhattisgarh is a state with a ‘politically assertive middle peasantry’, where the 
landholding conditions ensure that nearly 64 percent of the area under rice cultivation 
is covered by holdings of over 4 acres (Tillin, 2013: 121). Table 3 captures the details 
of announcements of pro-farmer measures and very high bonuses by both parties 
ahead of each state assembly election, including 2018, in the run-up to the elections 
later this year.  
 
The BJP’s 2013 manifesto explicitly stated: ‘the priority of the government is the 
prosperity of the farmers’. As we have seen, Chhattisgarh was amongst the first 
states in the country to develop a decentralised procurement policy, unleashing a 
zealous official drive to expand procurement, which even ended up creating some 
embarrassing discrepancies. In a span of five years, from 2008-09 to 2012-13, while 
the area under rice has remained stable at 3.7 mha, the production of rice increased 
by 42.2 percent, from 4.4 million tonnes to 6.3 million tonnes, but procurement  
 
																																																								
8 Interview, Raipur, April 2016. 
9 http://beyondmargins.blogspot.in/2015/04/paddy-what-price.html and  
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/congress-farmer-bodies-plan-protest-in-chhattisgarh-
4726789/ 
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Table 3: Farmer-related announcements by BJP and Congress, Chhattisgarh 
 
 
Announcement made by BJP Announcement made by Congress 
2003  Interest-free loan for farmers 
 Complete withdrawal of land tax  
 Setting up of a Farmer Welfare Fund 
 
2008  Interest-free loan for farmers  
 Free 5 HP electricity for farmers 
 Farmer Welfare Fund (recycled from 
2003) 
 Promise of rice at Re.1 per kg to the 
extremely poor 
 In 2007, promised Rs.50 bonus per 
quintal in additional to the Rs.50 already 
introduced by the Centre. BJP reacted to 
Congress’ announcement of Rs.250 as 
bonus by announcing Rs.270 as bonus 
per quintal. On winning the elections, they 
gave the bonus for one kharif marketing 
season, but refused to do so from the 
next year onwards. 
 Free power  
 Promise of rice at Rs.2 per kg to all 
ration cardholders in Chhattisgarh 
 Promised Rs.250 in their own 
manifesto 
2013  Interest-free loan for farmers, 
  Free 5 HP electricity for farmers 
(recycled from 2008) 
 ‘Kisaan Kalyan Kosh’ or Farmer Welfare 
Fund to be established (recycled from 
2003 and 2008) 
 Bonus Rs.300 per quintal on paddy (no 
bonus in 2009, 2010 and 2011) 
 MSP Rs.2100 per quintal for paddy 
 Provision of Re.1 per kg of rice to the 
poor 
 ‘Fasal Beema guarantee’ or Crop 
Insurance Guarantee Scheme for farmers 
 A policy to be formulated for immediate 
compensation in cases of crop failure 
 Special agro-forestry zones (not created) 
 35 kg of free rice in a month to BPL 
and APL families 
 Free power supply to peasants for 
5Hp pumps 
 Rs.2000 per quintal procurement 
price for paddy, out of which Rs.500 
to be paid to the woman members 
of their family 
2018  ‘Bonus Tihar’ from 3 to 13 October 2017 
around Diwali to give paddy bonus of 
Rs.300 per quintal procured from them. 
This will amount to Rs.2100 crore as 
bonus to 13 lakh paddy cultivators.  
The state Congress Legislature Party 
leader, T. S. Singhdeo, has appealed to 
people from all sections of the society, 
non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and intellectuals to send their 
suggestions and recommendations for 
the party’s manifesto. 
Source: Multiple newspaper reports. 
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increased by 67 percent from 2.9 million tonnes to 4.8 million tonnes.10 Moreover, the 
strong push for procurement and high support prices for farmers by the ruling party 
has come at a price. The opposition Congress has been quick to call out the BJP, 
when it has withdrawn bonuses in non-election years, accusing the government of 
‘cheating farmers’.11 When this situation has combined with drought conditions, as in 
2016, the government has been accused of sponsoring a ‘tragedy’, with ‘trusting’ 
farmers being driven to distress, even suicide.12 In fact, the ruling BJP has come 
under pressure due to a conflict with the Modi-led central government over its 
bonuses, frequently the highest in the country. The central government has 
reprimanded Chhattisgarh for distorting market prices, provoking appeals by CM 
Singh to PM Modi that ‘withdrawing bonuses will reduce buffer stock’ and ‘adversely 
impact food security in the country’.13 The PDS is a high-profile programme with clear 
political stakes.  
 
The situation is strikingly different in Jharkhand. To begin with, the land area devoted 
to foodgrain production is much lower (2.55 million hectares/mh as compared with 
5.06 mh in Chhattisgarh in 2015-16; 1.5 mh for rice as against 3.81 mh in the 
latter14). Chhattisgarh is amongst the top rice-producing states in the country. And 
yet, the nearly comparable numbers of cultivators in both states (3,814,832 in 
Jharkhand, 4,004,796 in Chhattisgarh15) suggests that more of Jharkhand’s farmers 
have marginal landholdings. They are less politically organised, and do not form a 
formidable electoral group, unlike in Chhattisgarh. One rice miller in Ranchi 
lamented,16  
 
‘All states have a procurement policy. Look at Chhattisgarh. Here in 
Jharkhand, nobody has formulated a procurement policy till date. The same 
MSP announced by the Centre prevails. It is only because the actual market 
price is lower than the MSP that the situation is continuing’.  
 
Jharkhand has suffered from lackadaisical procurement, its agencies consistently 
missing procurement targets.17 In 2011, it was a late entrant to the decentralised 
procurement scheme. 18  Consistent operational problems with state procurement 
agencies led to the appointment of a private agency (the National Collateral 
Management Agency) in January 2016, though recent reports of its performance 
																																																								
10 http://cacp.dacnet.nic.in/ViewReports.aspx?Input=2&PageId=39&KeyId=519 
11  http://www.business-standard.com/article/politics/raman-govt-denied-bonus-to-farmers-
over-paddy-procured-115030401569_1.html 
12 Interview with an agricultural scientist, Raipur, April 2016. 
13 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/dont-stop-paddy-bonus-raman-to-pm/ and 
http://beyondmargins.blogspot.in/2015/04/paddy-what-price.html 
14 http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/PDF/Glance-2016.pdf 
15 http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/PDF/Glance-2016.pdf 
16 Interview, Ranchi, May 2016. 
17  https://www.hindustantimes.com/ranchi/way-behind-target-jharkhand-procures-1-47-lakh-
mt-paddy-in-three-months/story-qI82usR8fM7svS81wJUOSO.html 
18 http://dfpd.nic.in/decentralized-procurement.htm 
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have not been favourable.19 The scale of procurement compared to Chhattisgarh is 
thus much lower in Jharkhand (in 2017-18, the rice procurement target in the former 
was a staggering 4.8 million metric tonnes, as compared to 0.25 million metric tonnes 
in the latter20). 
 
From early on, prioritising the PDS made for political common sense in Chhattisgarh. 
While satisfying farmers through expanded and generous procurement was an 
important driver, that alone would not ensure the improved delivery of foodgrains to 
the poor. In 2003, Raman Singh reversed the decision of his predecessor (Ajit Jogi) 
in 2001 to allow private participation in the running of fair price shops. Reports 
indicate that local discontent centred on dealer corruption.21 The erstwhile principal 
secretary to the CM said, ‘All the shops were controlled by karyakartas (workers) of 
the ruling party. He [Raman Singh] agreed that the shops be taken from nearly 9,000 
people. This was indeed a very bold decision’.22 There was a huge backlash, with 
dealers contesting the move; in 2005, the Chhattisgarh High Court gave its approval 
to the move, by dismissing more than 400 petitions lodged against the government. 
Singh is credited for staying firm, risking alienation. Observers offered 23  many 
explanations, including that the move annoyed a few, but made many others happy, 
or that many dealers found ways of participating in the new institutional 
arrangements favouring SHGs. In 2014, there were 11,077 fair price shops, of which 
413 are being operated by GPs, 4,354 by cooperative societies, 2,405 by women 
SHGs, 151 by Forest Protection Committees and 36 by urban local bodies24). The 
government also introduced various other measures to incentivise dealerships to be 
viable (like raising the commission to PDS shop owners from three to 35 rupees per 
quintal; and providing interest-free loans up to 75,000 rupees).25  
 
Such political momentum never unfolded in Jharkhand, where successive political 
leaders riding fragile coalitions were extremely loathe to alienate any politically 
important group. Mooij (2001) reported the influential status of the PDS dealers in 
Bihar and the newly formed Jharkhand. She estimated that there were over 59,000 
dealers, whose numbers had increased considerably in the previous decade, in part 
due to fair price shop licences being handed out to supporters of the ruling RJD 
party. The PDS dealers’ association has remained very active in Bihar, Jharkhand’s 
parent state (Mooij, 2001). In Jharkhand too, dealerships have continued to be 
dominated by the upper castes. It was simply not on the radar of any government to 
																																																								
19  https://www.hindustantimes.com/ranchi/way-behind-target-jharkhand-procures-1-47-lakh-
mt-paddy-in-three-months/story-qI82usR8fM7svS81wJUOSO.html 
20 http://dfpd.nic.in/procurement-figures.htm 
21  http://www.forbesindia.com/article/on-assignment/how-the-pds-is-changing-in-
chattisgarh/19972/1 
22 Interview, Raipur, June 2015. 
23 Multiple interviews with officials and civil society activists, Raipur, 2014 and 2015. 
24 http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/raipur/chhattisgarhs-pds-system-draws-
appreciation.html 
25  http://www.forbesindia.com/article/on-assignment/how-the-pds-is-changing-in-
chattisgarh/19972/1 
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take them on. Our interviews in Ranchi with assorted officials and rice millers 
revealed that an attempt was made in 2009 by the Food Secretary, which led to her 
own transfer from the post. The absence of any functioning panchayat system (the 
first panchayat elections were held in 2010) contributed to the virtually unchallenged 
local power hold of PDS dealers. The PDS system has been opened up to women’s 
SHGs since 2011,26 though it is still the private dealer shops that corner the higher 
numbers of beneficiaries. And, as a local activist remarked, ‘It hardly matters if the 
dealership is run privately or by an SHG, the commission is so low that dealers are 
compelled to cheat’.27 
 
The concerted pursuit of PDS reform in Chhattisgarh has yielded a positive popular 
impression. A 2013 survey organised by important news media revealed that 94 
percent of those surveyed were aware of the food security programme and thought 
well of it. 28  A food inspector interviewed in Raigarh district said, ‘The PDS has 
benefited our CM, it has helped him win elections’.29 There are profound spatial 
variations in PDS implementation in Chhattisgarh, although investigating this is 
beyond the scope of this research. For instance, the Maoist affected districts in the 
south (Bastar, Dantewada) have experienced difficult situations, with rations 
frequently being diverted to the camps used by police and security forces (Sundar, 
2016). In Jharkhand, while the PDS has improved in recent years,30 Jharkhand is still 
amongst the lowest performing states for PDS (Bhattacharya et al., 2017).  
 
Finally, in deep contrast with Chhattisgarh, there is no personal association of the 
PDS in Jharkhand with any one politician or party. Although some chief ministers of 
Jharkhand undertook important steps (Hemant Soren, for example, introduced the 
chawal diwas in 2014, and Arjun Munda in 2010 ordered the provision of rice at one 
rupee to households excluded from the BPL list), the PDS is not part of any leader’s 
dominant political narrative. A brief comparison of the election manifestoes of BJP, 
JMM and Congress ahead of the last 2014 election revealed no seminal focus on the 
PDS as such (only the BJP mentions a promise of 35 kg of rice or wheat at Rs 1 per 
kg31). In contrast, PDS/paddy procurement is a key part of the ruling BJP’s political 
success narrative, with 12 out of 36 achievements listed on its website being related 
to this. 32  And, interestingly enough, state largesse on the PDS has not run 
Chhattisgarh’s coffers to the ground. Finance accounts data showed that in 2012-13, 
the fiscal deficit in Chhattisgarh was the lowest in the country (Choudhury, 2015). 
This is partly attributed to the generalised measures for fiscal consolidation required 
																																																								
26 https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/jharkhand/efforts-to-revamp-pds/cid/416889 
27 Interview, Ranchi, May 2016. 
28 https://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-to-retain-power-in-chhattisgarh-survey-1212277.html 
29 Interview, Raigarh, March 2015. 
30  https://www.dailyo.in/politics/pds-biometric-aadhaar-card-public-distribution-system-bpl-
apl/story/1/20208.html 
31  http://www.bjp.org/en/media-resources/press-releases/salient-points-of-bjp-manifesto-for-
legislative-assembly-election-2014-for-jharkhand-state 
 
32 http://www.bjpcg.com/ 
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by the Centre of all states, though the prudent role of the revenue bureaucracy in 
improving Chhattisgarh’s tax collection mattered too.33   
5.2.2 Political enablement of bureaucratic capacity: Isolation of PDS for reform, 
PDS innovation and responsiveness 
The nature of political leadership at the time of state creation played a significant role 
in shaping bureaucratic capacity in the initial years. Moreover, as we argue, public 
action, civil society engagement and judicial intervention also contributed to the 
deployment of bureaucratic capacity for initiating food policy reform and improving 
implementation, but to different degrees of effectiveness in the two states.  
 
The creation of a new state offered the opportunity to set new administrative 
standards and energise the bureaucracy. Chhattisgarh benefited from a cleaner 
bureaucratic protocol, with the division of its bureaucratic cadre handled more 
effectively than Jharkhand (completing the process of state cadre bifurcation in two 
years, as compared with four in Jharkhand). Conveying the enthusiasm of being 
assigned to the new state of Chhattisgarh, a high-ranking official34 said, ‘When I 
came to the state I was very happy. When you come to a new state you set the 
standards, the benchmarks’. Importantly, Chhattisgarh’s first chief minister was an 
ex-civil servant, who was able to lay out a clearer administrative vision for the state 
and build greater cohesion within the bureaucracy. In contrast, in Jharkhand, the 
incoming political leadership was less experienced in administration, and, in the 
words of a senior IAS officer, ‘the bureaucracy became a group by itself, more 
seasoned in politicking than the politicians themselves’.35 A group of bureaucrats 
actively ‘schooled’ the new political rulers in ‘how to make money through files, 
tenders and appointments’ (ibid.).  
 
Many senior IAS officials in Jharkhand interviewed for this research commented on 
the factionalised nature of the cadre, which has abetted multiple processes of rent-
seeking. Many felt that Jharkhand was ‘no place’ for ‘honest officials’. The absence of 
stable terms of political leadership left the bureaucracy rudderless and uncertain 
about their term and position in Jharkhand. These initial conditions played an 
important role in shaping the trajectories of PDS reform and implementation in the 
two states. Jharkhand’s Food and Civil Supplies department saw a high turnover of 
secretaries, with 21 transfers between 2005 and 2015, while Chhattisgarh’s food 
secretaries had more stable stints, with only six transfers in 10 years. As a result, 
bureaucrats in Chhattisgarh were able to drive and stabilise the reform process better 
compared to Jharkhand.  
 
This political enablement of bureaucratic capacity resulted in the prioritisation of 
some key administrative goals. In Chhattisgarh, a concerted effort was made to 
																																																								
33 Interview with the first finance secretary of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, August 2014. 
34 Interview with senior IAS official, Raipur, June 2015 
35 Interview with senior IAS official, Ranchi, August 2014. 
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increase revenues by accelerating mobilisation efforts through revamped tax norms 
and ensuring stricter compliance. 36  This comfortable fiscal deficit allowed the 
government to expand the PDS by increasing coverage and also creating new 
administrative posts for monitoring the programme. Ample fiscal space therefore 
allowed Chhattisgarh to back a clear welfare agenda with the necessary resources. 
In addition, stern messages and the threat of action against corruption in the PDS 
were sent out by the top leadership – ‘the tenor was set from the beginning’, said a 
high-ranking civil servant. The symbol of religious fasting, or ‘vrat’, was used to 
appeal to PDS officials to stay clean: ‘This is a year of fasting – no one will take 
money’.37 In contrast, revenue mobilisation was not similarly prioritised in Jharkhand 
in the early years, resulting in lower revenue collection than in Chhattisgarh, despite 
having a similarly sized tax base (Choudhury, 2015).  
 
Expanding the capacities of the frontline state to deliver its food subsidy programme 
was a key administrative goal that was prioritised in Chhattisgarh. There are 559 
sanctioned posts for food inspectors in Chhattisgarh, who monitor implementation 
and ensure people are getting their full entitlement. In contrast, Jharkhand only has 
264 sanctioned posts for block supply officers, who play a similar role. While each 
food inspector in Chhattisgarh is assigned to a cluster of panchayats, instead of an 
entire block, to maximise effectiveness, there are a large number of vacancies. The 
latest Food Department reports (2016-17) indicate that out of 559 food inspector 
posts, 289 remain vacant. In Jharkhand, line department vacancies are also common 
and significantly impact upon effectiveness. For example, out of 264 sanctioned 
posts for the block supply officer, 130 remain vacant.38  
In Chhattisgarh, while vacancies persist – suggesting that the problem of boosting 
bureaucratic capacity in the most fundamental sense is a difficult one to address –, 
administrators are sensitive to this, and adopt creative approaches to get the job 
done. As a highly ranked civil servant said, 
‘At the time of state creation, we had 146 blocks and we needed 180 people 
for all blocks, but we had only 90. An additional budget had to be created, and 
because we are resource rich, we had the fiscal space to do this. Then it was 
a question of priority: how much did we want that inspection to be done? As 
there was a will, there were enough posts, even within the existing 
administration, that could be converted into food inspector posts. When there 
is political will, then the bureaucrat finds some way to do this.’39  
How the bureaucracy prioritised the PDS also becomes evident in its relationship 
with civil society. To a large extent, civil society engagement with the government on 
																																																								
36 Interview with senior IAS official, Raipur, August 2014. 
37 Interview with senior IAS official, Raipur, June 2015 
38 Information obtained through RTI. 
39 Interview, Raipur, June 2015.  
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
25	
	
food security issues in both states was led by a Right to Food commissioner 
appointed by the Supreme Court to monitor the implementation of its orders on the 
Right to Food case. These SC commissioners, who were former civil servants and 
‘eminent activists’ with movement-based backgrounds and long-standing experience 
with grassroots organisations, inevitably became a channel through which civil 
society communicated their concerns to the government (Pande, and Houtzager 
2016). Although judicial backing and the relative autonomy of the commissioners’ 
position were supposed to lend credibility to the concerns raised by civil society, the 
effectiveness of the commissioner’s office in moving the bureaucracy still differed in 
the two states.  
 
Both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh have active state chapters of the national Right to 
Food campaign, which have pursued the demand for food as an intrinsic right to life 
through legal and grassroots struggles. The Right to Food campaign became ‘a 
crucial political partner of the courts through their persistent engagement with legal 
decision-making and bureaucratic reform (Gauri and Brinks, 2008; Hertel, 2014). 
While in Jharkhand, public action predominantly assumed the form of public hearings 
and protests; in Chhattisgarh, legal advocacy work was also emphasised. The Raipur 
High Court passed two interim orders related to the Right to Food case, but no such 
orders were passed in Jharkhand. The court orders proved consequential. Concerted 
district- and local-level mobilisation and investigations of complaints around the non-
implementation of the court’s orders bolstered the lobbying of civil society activists in 
Chhattisgarh. Moreover, community health workers, who were part of the state-wide 
Mitanin programme also played an important role in raising awareness around 
nutrition, and formed nutrition monitoring committees (Garg, 2006).  
Benefiting from the wider context of decentralised public services, grassroots 
mobilisation in Chhattisgarh thus took on a more institutionalised form. Some civil 
society activists were also able to embed themselves within public institutions, such 
as the State Health Resource Society, to promote the idea of a more universal right 
to food and health. This perhaps stemmed from the notion that Chhattisgarh’s 
bureaucrats viewed ‘civil society as reasonable’.40 In Jharkhand, in comparison, civil 
society activists lamented the ‘repressed’ nature of Jharkhand’s bureaucracy, which, 
in the absence of ‘political will’, was not responsive to the demands and issues raised 
by the Right to Food campaign in the state.41 And yet, while the bureaucracy and civil 
society have shared a close relationship when it comes to food policy in 
Chhattisgarh, we cannot forget that the government’s record of dealing with activists 
and dissent more generally (particularly left-wing extremism) has been marred by 
cases of human rights violations and violent repression (Sundar, 2016).  
 
Both states experienced starvation deaths in the early years of statehood, but with 
very different ‘trigger effects’. The 2001-02 episode in Palamu district of Jharkhand 
																																																								
40 Interview with prominent health and nutrition activist, Raipur, December 2014. 
41 Interviews with activists, Ranchi, November 2014.  
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did not stir the political leadership to action. Although civil society groups highlighted 
the shocking conditions that led to these hunger deaths and called for state 
intervention through the PDS, according to a senior activist in the state,42 the cases 
were denied in the legislative assembly. In contrast, starvation deaths in Dantewada 
district in 2004 became an important turning point in Chhattisgarh’s PDS reform 
trajectory. The commissioner on the Right to Food case was able to successfully 
mobilise senior bureaucrats to set up a ‘high powered committee on starvation’ and 
assess the functioning of the PDS in tribal areas. During the visits of this committee, 
which were guided by civil society groups, senior bureaucrats took note of several 
implementation irregularities and reassigned food inspectors to particularly 
vulnerable areas. It was after this intervention that Chhattisgarh initiated the de-
privatisation of fair price shops. As a testament to this productive relationship 
between the bureaucracy and civil society in Chhattisgarh, an activist pointed out that 
‘Where the Right to Food campaign was strong, they were able to take on vested 
interests. They knew that they had state support’.43 
 
Another trigger that galvanised civil society engagement with the government in 
Chhattisgarh came with the defeat of the BJP in a crucial by-election in Kota in 2007, 
which only confirmed the electoral appeal of the farmer-driven PDS. According to the 
food and civil supplies secretary in Chhattisgarh, 
 
‘the core reason for why reforms happened in Chhattisgarh was the specific 
incident of the BJP’s electoral defeat in the 2005 by-election. Post the result 
in a press conference, the CM said, “We lost because we weren’t able to 
supply rice in the PDS shops”.’44  
 
Apparently within 10 days of the Kota defeat, Singh put together a crack team of 
bureaucrats who were given the additional charge of food and civil supplies. It was 
during this time that the inputs of civil society were solicited and acted on by state 
officials. In Jharkhand, things improved marginally after 2009, when the governor 
took a personal interest in the PDS during a brief period of president’s rule, and a 
proactive administrative services officer initiated a series of key reforms, including 
doorstep delivery, the opening of 12,000 new fair price shops to self-help groups and 
free foodgrain to 2.4 million drought-affected poor families. Chief ministers, who took 
an interest in the PDS in Jharkhand, undertook populist measures, rather than 
systematic improvements as in Chhattisgarh.  
 
In Chhattisgarh, it could be argued that the nature of the political leadership and its 
relationship with the bureaucracy enabled the productive deployment of state 
capacity, allowing the state to respond to organised civic and public action in the 
realm of food policy. The strong moral and relatively indisputable basis of food 
																																																								
42 Interview, Ranchi, August 2014. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Interview, Raipur, June 2015. 
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provision certainly helped matters, allowing the government to respond much more 
benignly to civil society pressure than, for example, in the arena of extraction. In this 
latter, the polarised nature of positions and demands has led to much more 
repressive reactions by the state. In Jharkhand, that civil action around food was not 
particularly effective is paradoxical, given its rich social movement legacy. However, 
given the messy realities of political competition and the internal organisation of the 
bureaucracy, activists were not able to elicit state responsiveness to their demands.  
5.2.3 Elite rents and state capacity: PDS functionality and PDS corruption 
Both Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are mineral-rich states. Statehood meant that 
plentiful iron and coal resources were available for extractive rent-seeking by political 
elites. On a grand scale, a steady top-level political leadership, in power for over a 
decade, has benefited from the continued availability of extractive rents. As Chief 
Minister, Raman Singh has held tight control over the mining and industry portfolios. 
He has personally overseen the signing of multiple MOUs (memorandums of 
understanding) with mining companies, and weighed in on the allocation of coal and 
iron blocks to favoured parties. A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed in 2013 in 
the Chhattisgarh, directly implicating the CM.45 In Jharkhand, successive high-level 
political leaders, including Chief Ministers Shibu Soren and Madhu Koda, have 
influenced discretionary coal and iron allocations and faced serious corruption 
charges. Perhaps less relevant to this argument, although important still, is that 
Jharkhand’s politicians have lacked Chhattisgarh’s formidable PR machinery, that 
accompanies a long-staying political party in power.46 As a result, extractive rent-
seeking in Chhattisgarh has not suffered the same level of public exposure as in 
Jharkhand, where it has been more brazen. In both cases, then, extractive rent-
seeking exists, but only in Chhattisgarh did the political elite prioritise and isolate the 
PDS for reform, as explained by the previous two sections.  
 
In Chhattisgarh, greater stability of tenure and a steady supply of big rents allowed its 
chief minister to prioritise some areas of reform, whereas in Jharkhand, there is 
commensurate instability, wherein short turnovers meant that rent-seeking 
considerations wiped out any serious engagement with reform. Extending the 
analysis offered by Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004), Hickey et al. (2016) and others, 
this paper shows that when there is contained political competition and a long-staying 
dominant leader (Chhattisgarh), high-level rent-seeking can coexist with the pursuit 
of developmental outcomes, more than in a situation where the political competition 
is fragmented (Jharkhand). 
 
Nevertheless, this still begs the question: has the political insulation of the PDS 
eliminated programmatic corruption within the PDS in Chhattisgarh, more than in 
																																																								
45 Interview with litigant, Raipur, August 2016. 
46 A strong government in power in Chhattisgarh is suspected to have warded off the centrally 
appointed Shah Commission on illegal mining from scrutinising the state at the same time as 
Jharkhand. 
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Jharkhand? The evidence here is complicated, and suggests that programmatic 
reform in Chhattisgarh has coexisted with some elements of patronage as well as 
wilful corruption.47 Chandra (2004) writes that politicians generally prefer to provide 
‘patronage goods’ like handpumps and licences, rather than policy legislation or 
reform. She argues that the former ensures a continuous ‘sale’ of particularised 
benefits and the earning of political loyalty, whereas the latter wins one-time vote 
support. However, as we have seen, PDS has the built-in programme advantage, 
whereby policy reform has enabled a continuous flow of subsidised food to a large 
majority, winning continuous electoral support. While superior bureaucratic capacity 
has been tackled effectively to curb corruption in order to improve delivery, on the 
one hand, equally, corruption continues at multiple stages of the complex 
procurement chain. This latter can be thought of as a form of patronage, whereby 
ruling political elites allow state resources to be used to either re-purchase the same 
rice twice, or pay for more rice than is procured, with the rest being siphoned away to 
the black market, in exchange for the political support of traders, rice millers and 
transporters. This contrasts with Jharkhand, where rent-seeking is indiscriminately 
existent, and this, combined with poor bureaucratic capacity, is hampering its 
effective functioning considerably.   
 
As previously discussed, superior bureaucratic capacity in Chhattisgarh, principally in 
terms of staffing and better institutionalised procedures, has been a critical asset for 
the top-level leadership and bureaucracy in weeding out everyday corruption in PDS 
delivery. Raman Singh’s strict message to MPs, that this was a programme that ‘had 
to be made to work’,48 was accompanied by his personal oversight over monitoring 
procedures (described in detail in Tillin et al., 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 2017). 
Curbing PDS corruption in successive stages (a few highlights include: checking 
dealer corruption through de-privatisation; raising dealer commission rates to 
incentivise honesty; and curbing corrupt private transporters by replacing these with 
state-owned vans; see Bhattacharya et al., 2017) has been a major component of the 
Chhattisgarh government’s PDS success narrative. The state reduced leakages from 
51.7 percent to 9.3 percent from 2004-05 to 2011-12 (Dreze and Khera, 2015). 
 
This also explains the scale of uproar when PDS corruption became public, amongst 
the most dramatic being the Nagarik Apoorti Nigam (NAN) crisis of 2015-16. This is 
the government body housed within the Department of Food and Civil Supplies 
responsible for procurement. Large wads of cash were discovered in the homes and 
offices of senior officials,49 casting doubts on the acquiescence of the CM. The man 
nicknamed as the ‘chaur baba’ (rice man) was even lampooned as ‘chaur chor baba’ 
(rice thief). This confirmed what ‘insiders’ (politicians, journalists, agricultural 
scientists, the traders and millers involved in the rice trade) to the system long knew:  
																																																								
47 See Kelsall and Heng (2016) for a gripping account of the symbiosis of patronage and 
programmatic reform in the health sector in Cambodia. 
48 Field interview with a local political leader, Raigarh, March 2015. 
49  https://www.firstpost.com/business/economy/scam-stains-famed-chhattisgarh-pds-
systemic-loot-runs-into-crores-2161081.html 
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Figure 4. Nested flows of corruption in the PDS system 
 
 
Source: Interview with key informant, Raipur, April 2016. 
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the procurement system ensured the interests of middlemen (who are not aligned to 
any one party, but are critical actors in the local political economy), the lower-level 
party workers of the BJP (who take charge of local procurement centres), and rice 
millers (who are clearly pro-BJP). One informant painstakingly described a six-level 
nested process of corruption that flourishes within the PDS system in Chhattisgarh 
(see Figure 4). A second controversy that also damaged the government’s credibility  
was the ‘bogus’ cards matter of 2013-14, where much was made by the opposition of 
the issuing of over 1.4 million cards to ineligible or non-existent beneficiaries.50 A top-
ranking advisor to the CM said, ‘The CM was advised not to reduce its excess cards. 
However, finally the government could not go through the card cancellation 
campaign, and had to take back its announcement’.51 Despite these controversies, 
even opposition leaders think he is incontrovertible: ‘nothing is touching him’, said 
one.52 
 
In Jharkhand, PDS leakages remain high, despite improvements (85.2 percent to 
44.4 percent from 2004-05 to 2011-12, according to Dreze and Khera, 2015). 
Jharkhand inherited a weak bureaucratic apparatus from Bihar, as much damage 
had been done during the Laloo era to de-institutionalise the state, in order to reduce 
the grip of the upper castes (Mathew and Moore, 2011). However, as previously 
argued, politics in the new state did nothing to improve matters. There is a great 
dearth of food inspectors, tasked with quality inspection in FCI- and SFC-run 
godowns, as well as the fair price shops, and relaxed norms of conduct. One PDS 
shop owner in Ranchi quipped, ‘it is a big deal if a food inspector comes once a 
year’.53 Since the BJP government came to power in 2014, however, the new 
administration has tried to improve matters. The proactive food and civil supplies 
minister is reportedly trying to urgently address the problem of manpower in the 
department,54 as well as ushering a new phase of technocratic reforms centred on 
biometric authentication.55  
 
Procurement within Jharkhand’s PDS system operates at a much smaller scale than 
does Chhattisgarh’s, but the system has suffered from entrenched corruption. In a 
similar vein to Chhattisgarh, a close compact between the rice miller and middlemen 
ensures that farmers are often paid a price below the MSP. But, unlike Chhattisgarh, 
the problem is not one of ‘excessive’ engagement by actors within the procurement 
system (which leads to situations like the double counting of rice), but perhaps of a 
deficit. There are massive problems with rice collection and transportation, with rice 
routinely not being collected to and from the FCI godowns. The State Food 
Corporation (Jharkhand’s equivalent of NAN) is a decrepit and understaffed 
																																																								
50  https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/fake-ration-card-scam-accused-is-now-
chhattisgarh-bjp-treasurer/ 
51 Interview, Raipur, June 2015. 
52 Interview, Raipur, June 2015. 
53 Interview, Ranchi, May 2016. 
54 Interview, Ranchi, May 2016. 
55 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jamshedpur/Jharkhand-minister-favours-technology-
to-check-PDS-corruption/articleshow/50509303.cms 
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organisation. Dealers are particularly angry, as they bear the brunt of losses, having 
paid for grain that languishes in the godowns. There is a collusion of interests 
between private transporters and SFC officials that further explains irregularities and 
delays in delivery. However, the shock value of exposing PDS corruption is not a 
fraction of that in neighbouring Chhattisgarh, as it is simply par for the course. In 
summary, the PDS works with some elements of corruption in Chhattisgarh, whereas 
in Jharkhand, the more pervasive nature of corruption means that it does so to a 
limited extent. Better bureaucratic capacity in Chhattisgarh has been critical to 
implementing reforms, which is conspicuous by its absence in Jharkhand.  
 
As a postscript, in the latest phase, the central government-initiated digital 
identification scheme (Aadhar) is impacting upon both states’ ability to implement the 
PDS, albeit differently. Right to Food activists all over the country have protested the 
top-down requirement of linking the Aadhar number to a beneficiary’s ration card, 
without which she may be denied rations.56 In Chhattisgarh, reported problems led to 
a prompt response from the Food Secretary that the state would not allow anyone to 
go without food.57  The commensurate response has been chaotic in Jharkhand, 
where the government was caught on the wrong foot, even denying suspected 
‘starvation deaths’.58 The food minister has openly differed from the food secretary, 
who had indicated that only the Aadhar-linked cards would be permissible. The chief 
minister of Jharkhand has favoured a move to a cash-based system (Direct Benefit 
Transfer), bypassing the PDS altogether, but this has been recently withdrawn 
following wide-scale protest59.  
6. Conclusion 
Food security programmes come with a strong moral imperative. Popular 
mobilisations for the Right to Food across the world have focused the spotlight on the 
state to back food security interventions. However, there remain important variations 
in the political prioritisation of food-based welfare programmes. We find that, despite 
the seemingly universal appeal of a food subsidy programme like the Public 
Distribution System in India, political incentives that drive support for the programme 
differ considerably between its subnational regions. This paper explores precisely 
why and how the Public Distribution System receives varying levels of political and 
institutional support under distinctive subnational environments.  
 
India’s nationally driven food security programme, with its long history, provides an 
appropriate context to scrutinise this subnational variation and ask why the PDS is 
																																																								
56  https://www.dailyo.in/politics/pds-biometric-aadhaar-card-public-distribution-system-bpl-
apl/story/1/20208.html 
57  https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/in-chhattisgarh-insistence-on-aadhaar-is-disrupting-a-
successful-pds-system-1684752 
58  https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pds-struggle-on-in-jharkhand-govt-denies-
starvation-deaths/story-dxh4Fy1ShHWGsE7J4zqXsJ.html 
59  https://thewire.in/rights/after-months-of-protest-jharkhand-govt-withdraws-direct-benefit-
transfer-experiment 
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prioritised in one state, and not in another. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, with similar 
demographic and nutrition profiles, make for a productive comparison, where we 
could also exercise some control over the starting point, which has not been 
vigorously explored in the literature so far. The paper poses three analytical 
questions, drawing upon the specific conditions of these cases, and their political 
histories as new states. First, why is it that Chhattisgarh’s upper caste elite pushes 
for PDS and Jharkhand’s adivasi leadership does not? Second, despite its richer 
context of civil society activism, why was civil society in Chhattisgarh able to 
influence the bureaucracy more effectively? And third, even though both are mineral-
rich states, whose leaders engage in extractive rent-seeking, why does 
Chhattisgarh’s leadership insulate the PDS for reform, but Jharkhand’s does not?  
 
In addressing these questions, the paper engages seriously with the question of the 
political deployment of state capacity, which has been the subject of the latest wave 
of critical scholarship on welfare provision (Centeno et al., 2017; Vom Hau, 2012; 
Vom Hau and Hickey, 2016). It shows that three key dimensions –nature of political 
and electoral competition; the social bases of political parties; and the political 
enablement of bureaucratic capacity – interact to produce the political prioritisation of 
the PDS in Chhattisgarh, but not in Jharkhand. Conceptually, the paper thus builds 
on a long tradition of research on welfare politics, which takes a class relational and 
democratic politics approach, but adds other elements around political coalitions and 
their particular use of bureaucratic capacity. The paper’s contribution lies especially 
in demonstrating the nested effects of these dimensions. As the analytical map 
(Figure 3) shows, important sub-dimensions and intermediate processes interact to 
shape key outcomes (like PDS policy innovation, responsiveness at critical junctures, 
and functionality despite corruption) that both demonstrate and reinforce the political 
prioritisation of this programme. The analysis pursued through this approach also 
helps answer the three questions in the following ways. 
 
First, close competition between two national parties, which built considerable 
pressure on the ruling party to deliver on its poll agendas, and an electorally 
important farmer constituency drove Chhattisgarh’s leadership to simultaneously 
prioritise policies of decentralised procurement and PDS reform. In Jharkhand, on the 
other hand, a fractured political mandate, lack of internal party cohesion and the 
absence of electoral pressure on reforming the PDS meant that patchy 
implementation persisted for nearly a decade since state creation.  
 
Second, while bureaucratic capacity in Chhattisgarh was developed through early 
political leadership and some inherited advantage from Madhya Pradesh, in 
Jharkhand, the fragmented bureaucracy mirrored the political landscape in the state. 
The responsiveness of the bureaucracy to judicial intervention and civil society that 
followed was perhaps predicated on this. This may explain why, even though civil 
society mobilisation in Jharkhand has a richer legacy, it has been less effective in 
leveraging the bureaucracy to introduce PDS reforms.  
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Finally, though the political leadership in both states engaged in high-level and high-
stakes rent-seeking, the sheer fact of tenure stability of the elected elites in 
Chhattisgarh meant that they enjoyed a steady supply of rents, allowing them to 
prioritise some areas of developmental reform. This was not the case in Jharkhand, 
where short-lived governments indiscriminately engaged in pervasive rent-seeking. 
And yet, the paper also shows that the political insulation of the PDS in Chhattisgarh 
for reform did not wipe out programmatic corruption here; although PDS corruption 
did not greatly compromise foodgrain delivery, unlike in Jharkhand. The relative 
superiority of the bureaucratic mechanism in the former mattered. 
 
We hope that the analysis presented here will be useful beyond the particular case of 
these states or even the Public Distribution System in India. In offering an 
explanatory framework for the political prioritisation of welfare that goes beyond elite-
centred accounts, a relational account of bureaucratic capacity that demonstrates the 
relevance of politician–bureaucratic relationships for state functionality and 
responsiveness, and a nuanced understanding of the interaction between rent-
seeking and the pursuit of developmental outcomes, the paper also seeks to 
advance the repertoire of conceptual tools available for understanding the many 
guises of the welfare state. 
  
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
34	
	
References 
Barrientos, A. and Pellissery, S. (2015). ‘Political factors in the growth of social 
assistance’ in S. Hickey, K. Sen and B. Bukenya (eds.), The Politics of 
Inclusive Development: Interrogating the Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 146-173. 
Berthet, S. (2011). ‘Chhattisgarh: Redefining the role of the state?’ In S. Berthetand 
G. Kumar (eds.), New States for a New India: Federalism and 
Decentralisation in the States of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Delhi: Manahor 
Publishers, pp. 87-115. 
Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2007). ‘Reforming public service delivery’. Journal of 
African Economies, 16(1): 127- 156 
Bhattacharya, S., Falcao, V. and Puri, R. (2017). ‘The Public Distribution System in 
India: Policy evolution and programme delivery trends’. In H. Alderman, U. 
Gentilini and R. Yemstov (eds.), The 1.5 Billion People Question: Food, 
Vouchers or Cash Transfers?, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, pp 43-
105. 
Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. (2011). Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way 
to Fight Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs. 
Chatterjee, M. (2014). ‘An improved PDS in a “reviving” state: Food security in 
Koraput, Odisha’. Economic and Political Weekly, 49(45): 49-59. 
Chandra, K. (2004). Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head 
Counts in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Choudhury, M. (2015). ‘Fiscal parameters of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand: A 
comparison’. Working Paper, National Institute for Public Finance and Policy, 
New Delhi. 
Chhibber, P. and Nooruddin, I. (2004). ‘Do party systems count?: The number of 
parties and government performance in the Indian States’. Comparative 
Political Studies, 37(2): 152-187. 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (2013). Price Policy for Kharif Crops: 
 The Marketing Season 2013-14. Department of Agriculture and Cooperation. 
 Ministry of Agriculture. Available online:  
 http://cacp.dacnet.nic.in/ViewReports.aspx?Input=2&PageId=39&KeyId=519 
 (accessed 6 December 2018). 
Corbridge, S. (2011). ‘The contested geographies of federalism in post-reform India’. 
 In S. Ruparelia,  S. Reddy, J. Harriss and S. Corbridge (eds.), Understanding 
 India’s New Political Economy: A Great Transformation? London and New 
 York: Routledge, pp. 66-80. 
Corbridge, S. and Harriss, J. (2000). Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu 
Nationalism and Popular Democracy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Centeno, M. A., Kohli, A. and Yashar, D. (2017). ‘Unpacking states in the developing 
world: Capacity, performance and politics’. In M. A. Centeno, A. Kolhi, D. J. 
Yasharand D. Mistree (eds.), States in the Developing World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
35	
	
Demeke, M., Pangrazio, G. and Maetz, M. (2008). Country Responses to the Food 
Security Crisis. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization.  
De La O, A. L. (2013). ‘Do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behavior? 
Evidence from a randomized experiment in Mexico’. American Journal of 
Political Science. 57(1): 1-14. 
di John, J. and Putzel, J. (2009). ‘Political settlements: Issues paper’, Governance 
and Social Development Resource paper, University of Birmingham, June. 
Dreze, J. (2004). ‘Democracy and the Right to Food’. Economic and Political Weekly. 
24 April. 
Dreze, J. and Sen, A. (2013). An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions. 
London: Allen Lane.  
Dreze, J. and Khera, R. (2014). ‘Water for the leeward India’, national/cover story, 
Outlook Magazine, 24 March. 
Dreze, J. and R. Khera, R. (2015). ‘Understanding the leakages in the Public 
Distribution System’. Economic and Political Weekly, L(7), 14 February. 
Dreze, J., Gupta, P., Khera, R. and Pimenta. I. (2016). ‘Food Security Act: How are 
India’s poorest states fairing?’ Ideas for India. October. Available online: 
http://ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article_id=1655 (accessed 6 December 
2018). 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Evans, P. (1994). ‘Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative 
political economy perspective on the Third World state’. In A. D. Kincaid and 
A. Portes (eds.), Comparative National Development: Society and Economy 
in the New Global Order. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
pp. 84-111.  
Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Evans, P., Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2017). ‘The political foundations of state 
effectiveness’. In M. A. Centeno, A. Kolhi, D. J. Yashar and D. Mistree (eds.), 
States in the Developing World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.380-408. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (2008). An Introduction to the Basic Concepts of 
Food Security. Rome: FAO Food Security Program.  
Garay, C. (2016). Social Policy Expansion in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Garg, S. (2006). ‘Chhattisgarh: Grassroot mobilisation for children's nutrition 
rights’. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(34): 3694-3700. 
Gauri, V. and D. Brinks (eds.) (2008). Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement 
of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Harriss, J. and Kohli, N. (2009). ‘Notes on the differing “states” of child undernutrition 
in rural India’. IDS Bulletin, 40(4): pp. 9-15. 
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
36	
	
Herring, R. (1988). Stealing Congress Thunder: The Rise to Power of a Communist 
Movement in South India. In P. Merkel and K. Lawson (eds.), When Parties 
Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations. Princeton, NJ: University Press. 
Heller, P. (2000). ‘Degrees of democracy: Some comparative lessons from India’. 
World Politics, 52 (July): 484-519. 
Hertel, S. (2014). ‘Hungry for justice: Social mobilization on the right to food in India’, 
Development and Change, 46(1): 72-94. 
Hickey, S., Sen, K. and Bukenya, B. (2016). The Politics of Inclusive Development: 
Interrogating the Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2001). Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: 
Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago, IL and London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Jenkins, R. (2011). ‘The politics of India’s Special Economic Zones’, in S. Corbridge, 
J. Harriss, S. Reddy and S. Ruparelia (eds.), India’s Great Transformation. 
New York: Routledge. 
Keefer, P. and Khemani, S. (2005). ‘Democracy, public expenditures and the poor: 
Understanding political incentives for providing public services’. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Kelsall, T and Heng, S. (2016). ‘Inclusive healthcare and the political settlement in 
Cambodia’, New Political Economy, 21(2): 238-255. 
Khan, M. (2010). ‘Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing 
institutions’, draft paper, Research Paper Series on ‘Growth-Enhancing 
Governance’.  London: SOAS, University of London. 
Khan, M. and Jomo, K. S. (eds.) (2000). Rents, Rent-seeking and Economic 
Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Khemani, S. (2010). ‘Political capture of decentralisation: Vote buying through grants 
financed local jurisdictions’, Policy Research Working Paper 5350. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Khera, R. (2011). ‘Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and 
explanations’. Economic and Political Weekly, 46: 36-50. 
Kohli, A. (1987). The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kohli, A. (2001). The Success of India’s Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kumar, G. (2011). ‘Smaller states, federalism and decentralisation: Implications for 
governance in Chhattisgarh’. In S. Berthet and G. Kumar (eds.), New States 
for a New India: Federalism and Decentralisation in the States of Jharkhand 
and Chhattisgarh. Delhi: Manohar Publishers, pp. 231-244. 
Lefebvre, B. (2011). ‘Mapping the Scheduled Tribes: Questioning the creation of new 
states in India’. In S. Berthet and G. Kumar (eds.), New States for a New 
India: Federalism and Decentralisation in the States of Jharkhand and 
Chhattisgarh. Delhi: Manohar Publishers, pp. 191-208.  
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
37	
	
Levy, B. (2014). Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in 
Development Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Levy, B. and Walton, M. (2013). ‘Institutions, incentives and service provision: 
Bringing politics back in’. ESID Working Paper 18. Manchester, Effective 
States and Inclusive Development   Research Centre, The University of 
Manchester. 
Mathew, S. and Moore M. (2011). ‘State incapacity by design: Understanding the 
Bihar story’. IDS Working Paper 366. Brighton: Centre for the Future State, 
Institute for Development Studies. 
Mawdsley, E. (2002). ‘Redrawing the body politics: Federalism, regionalism and the 
creation of new states in India’. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 40 
(3): 34-54. 
Mehta, P. B. and Walton, M. (2014). ‘Ideas, interests and the politics of development 
change in India: capitalism, inclusion and the state’. ESID Working Paper No 
36. Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research 
Centre, The University of Manchester. 
Melo, M. A., Ng’ethe, N. and Manor, J. (2012). Against the Odds: Politicians, 
Institutions and the Struggle against Poverty. New York: Columbia University 
Press, Columbia/Hurst. 
Mooij, J. (1998). ‘The political economy of the Public Distribution System in India’. 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 25(2): 77-101. 
Mooij, J. (1999). ‘Food policy in India: The importance of electoral politics in policy 
implementation’. Journal of International Development, 11: 625-636. 
Mooij, J. (2001). ‘Food and power in Bihar and Jharkhand: PDS and its functioning’. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 36(34): 3289-3299, 25-31 August 25-31. 
Mookherjee, D. (2004). The Crisis in Government Accountability. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Mukherji, N. (2012). The Maoists in India: Tribals under Siege. London: Pluto Press. 
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J. and Weingast, B. R. (2013). Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pande, S. and Houtzager, P. P. (2016). ‘Civil society innovation and resilience in the 
struggle for the Right to Food in India’. IDS Working Paper 475, Institute for 
Development Studies, Brighton. 
Parks, T. and Cole, W. (2010). ‘Political settlements: Implications for international 
development policy and practice’, The Asia Foundation Occasional Paper No. 
2, July. 
Pellissery, S. (2008). ‘Process deficits in the provision of social protection in rural 
Maharashtra’. In A. Barrientos and D. Hulme (eds.), Social Protection for the 
Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies and Politics. London: Palgrave, pp. 
227-246. 
Pattenden, J. (2017). ‘Class and social policy: The National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme in Karnataka, India’. Journal of Agrarian Change, 17(1): 
43-66.  
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
38	
	
Puri, R. (2012). ‘Reforming the Public Distribution System: Lessons from 
Chhattisgarh’. Economic and Political Weekly, 47(5): 21-23. 
Puri, R. (2017). ‘India’s National Food Security Act (NFSA): Early experiences’. 
LANSA Working Paper Series, 2017(14). 
Raghavan, M. (2004). ‘Politics of procurement and price support’. Economic and 
Political Weekly 39(5): 506-508. 
Rahman, A. (2014). ‘Revival of rural public distribution system expansion and 
outreach’. Economic and Political Weekly, 49(20): 62-68min 
Raykar N., Majumdar, M., Lakshminarayan R. and Menon, P. (2015). India Health 
Report: Nutrition 2015. New Delhi: Public Health Foundation of India. 
Srinivasan, V. (2014). Delivering Public Services Effectively: Tamil Nadu and 
Beyond. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Singh, P. K. (2008). ‘Jharkhand movement – from genesis till date’. In G. K. Bera, 
(ed.), The Unrest Axle: Ethno-social Movements in Eastern India. New Delhi: 
Mittal Publications, pp. 31-74.  
Singh, P. (2016). How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social 
Development in India. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sinha, D., Patnaik, B., Raaj, V., Bhattacharya, S. and Joshi, A. (2014). ‘Popular 
actions, state reactions: The moral and political economy of food in India’. 
Food Riots and Food Rights Project Report. Brighton/New Delhi: Institute of 
Development Studies, www.foodriots.org  
Sundar, N. (2016). The Burning Forest: India's War in Bastar. Delhi: Juggernaut. 
Tillin, L. (2013). Remapping India: New States and their Political Origins. New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press.  
Tillin, L., Saxena, A. and Sisodia, Y. S. (2015). ‘Comparing the politics of food 
subsidies in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh’. In L. Tillin, R. Deshpande 
and K. K. Kailash (eds.), Politics of Welfare: Comparisons across Indian 
States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
Transparency International India (2005). India Corruption Study to Improve 
Governance. New Delhi: Transparency International India.  
Vom Hau, M. (2012). ‘State capacity and inclusive development: New challenges and 
directions’. ESID Working Paper 2. Manchester: Effective States and 
Inclusive Development Research Centre, The University of Manchester. 
Vom Hau, M. and Hickey, S. (2016). ‘Power relations, political settlements and the 
deployment of state capacity in the developing world’. ESID draft paper. . 
Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, 
The University of Manchester. 
Walton, M. (2009). ‘The political economy of India’s malnutrition puzzle’. IDS Bulletin, 
40(4): 16-24. 
Whitfield, L. and Therkildsen, O. (2011). ‘What drives states to support the 
development of productive sectors? Strategies ruling elites pursue for political 
survival and their policy implications’. DIIS Working paper 2011:15. 
Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. 
The political prioritisation of welfare in India: Comparing the Public Distribution System in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand  
	
	
39	
	
Zucco, C. (2008). ‘The President’s “new” constituency: Lula and the pragmatic vote in 
Brazil’s 2006 presidential elections’. Journal of Latin American Studies, 40: 
29-49. 
 
 
	email: esid@manchester.ac.uk 
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) 
Global Development Institute, School of Environment, Education and Development,  
The University of Manchester, Oxford Road,  
Manchester M13 9PL, UK 
www.effective-states.org 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre 
 
The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) aims to 
improve the use of governance research evidence in decision-making. Our key focus is 
on the role of state effectiveness and elite commitment in achieving inclusive 
development and social justice.  
ESID is a partnership of highly reputed research and policy institutes based in Africa, 
Asia, Europe and North America. The lead institution is the University of Manchester. 
The other institutional partners are: 
• BRAC Institute of Governance and Development, BRAC University, Dhaka 
• Center for Democratic Development, Accra 
• Center for International Development, Harvard University, Boston 
• Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Malawi, Zomba 
• Graduate School of Development, Policy & Practice, Cape Town University 
• Institute for Economic Growth, Delhi 
In addition to its institutional partners, ESID has established a network of leading 
research collaborators and policy/uptake experts. 
	
 
